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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1956
of the labor dispute disqualification, were reported in the Northeastern
Reporter for the first time last year.10 As reported in the 1955 Survey,
this question has now been settled by the Ohio Supreme Court."
EDWIN R. TEPLE
TAXATION
Most of the judicial decisions on tax questions during this reporting
period were concerned with special problems under specific taxes. How-
ever, three decisions dealt with problems of exemptions which relate to
both real and personal taxation.
Exemptions
Ohio Revised Code section 5709.12 exempts real and personal prop-
erty belonging to "institutions that are used exclusively for charitable
purposes." A non-profit corporation was formed for the purpose of
treating and rehabilitating patients having physical disability, especially
from poliomyelitis. It purchased a parcel of land and began remodeling
and repairing to make the property suitable for the special purposes of
the institution. This renovation was in process during the tax year of
1955 and at all previous times while under the instituion's control, with
expectation that the premises would be ready for use sometime during
1956. The Board of Tax Appeals allowed the exemption for 1955, and
the county auditor appealed. The Supreme Court' affirmed the Board's
actions, holding that its decision was neither unlawful nor unreasonable.
In a per curiam opinion the court stated that it could not distinguish this
case from a recent prior decision 2 in which it had held property purchased
for charitable uses, being remodeled for such usage, and not being used
for a non-charitable purpose, is entitled to exemption during the course
of remodeling.
In another exemption casea the Supreme Court unanimously held that
land owned by a municipal corporation located in an outside Ohio
county, prepared for use and to -be used in connection with a reservoir
to hold water for supplying the municipality and its suburbs, is public
property used exclusively for a public purpose. The court relied upon
"0 Diaz v. Koppers Co., 133 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio App. 1951), and Allen v. Youngstown
Mumcapal Ry. Co., 134 N.E.2d 80 (Ohio App. 1954), both previously referred
to in the 1954 Survey, 6 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 291, 297 (1955).
"Cornell v. Bailey, 163 Ohio St. 50, 125 N.E.2d 323 (1955), discussed in the
1955 Survey, 7 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 321, 322 (1956).
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prior holdings that property owned by a municipal corporation is public
property4 and therefore within the coverage of the "public property"
exemption provisions of Ohio Revised Code section 5709.08, and that
the use of its property by a municipal corporation in supplying a public
utility service is for a public purpose,5 in bringing the property involved
in the principal case under the terms of section 5709.08.
In an earlier case,6 the court had determined that the fact that revenue
is incidentally derived from public property does not alone alter the
public character of the use. The principal case goes further in holding
that a public purpose of a proprietary nature is a public purpose under
Ohio Revised Code section 5709.08.
Ohio Revised Code section 5709.12 exempting municipal water
"works" would not include a reservoir and the real estate under it, under
the accepted principle of a "strict" though reasonable construction of tax
exemption statutes.7
The third exemption case involved the application of Ohio Revised
Code section 5709.08 to thepersonal property used in a retail shop owned
by a corporation organized for charitable purposes. While the book shop
sold to members of its group it also sold to the general public, and its
sales to all classes of purchasers were in excess of cost. The profits from
this enterprise were used exclusively for charitable purposes. The Su-
preme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals which
had held that the operation of the book shop was not exclusively charita-
ble in nature.8
'Application of Magnetic Springs Foundation, 165 Ohio St. 180, 134 N.E.2d 152
(1956).
-Good Samaritan Hospital Ass n v. Glander, 155 Ohio St. 507, 99 N.E.2d 473
(1951) Three members of the court dissented on the ground that prospective use
of property for an exempted purpose does not warrant its present exemption from
taxation. It may be significant that none of these dissenting judges concurred in the
later decision.
'Columbus v. County of Delaware, 164 Ohio St. 605, 132 N.E.2d 747 (1956)
'Toledo v. Jenkins, 143 Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E.2d 656 (1944).
' State ex rel. v. Toledo, 48 Ohio St. 112, 26 N.E. 1061 (1891), wherein one of the
issues was whether the taxing power could be constitutionally exercised.
'Toledo v. Jenkins, 143 Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E. 2d 656 (1944),
'See I re Bond Hill-Roselawn Hebrew School, 151 Ohio St. 70, 84 N.E.2d 270
(1949), for an application of this principle of statutory construction.
'Lutheran Book Shop v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St. 359, 131 N.E.2d 219 (1955). This
decision follows the ruling in Gospel Worker Society v. Evatt, 140 Ohio St. 185, 42
N.B.2d 900 (1942), which stated that the test is the present use of the property
rather than the ultimate use of proceeds received from the property sought to be
exempted.
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Specific Taxes
1. Forfeture Sales of Real Property for Delinquent Taxes
The case of Ratajczak v. Carneyg presented an interesting application
of the good faith rule in the payment of real property taxes to void a
delinquent tax sale of a property. Two parcels of land were conveyed to
the plaintiff by a single warranty deed which described them as one.
Plaintiff then notified the county treasurer of the transfer and received
the semiannual tax bills which were paid promptly in the belief, in good
faith, that the payments covered all of the taxes assessed against all of the
property. The county auditor, however, did not make the necessary
changes in the tax duplicate, and all of the taxes due were not included
in the tax bills sent to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, however, believed
that all taxes had been paid, and that he had taken all the necessary steps
required of him to pay the tax. Under these circumstances, the court held
that the unpaid taxes were deemed to have been paid and therefore a for-
feiture sale of that portion of the property for delinquent taxes was un-
authorized and void.'0  The county authorities and the tax sale purchaser
relied on Ohio Revised Code section 323.13, providing that a failure to
receive any bill required by the section did not excuse the failure or delay
to pay any taxes due, as a defense. The court held the section inapplica-
ble to the specific circumstances.
2. Personal Property
The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed a determination of the State Tax
Commissioner that the value of licensed house trailers should be included
in the average inventory of a dealer engaged primarily in selling house
trailers, despite the fact that he had licensed them under the statutes pre-
scribing the levy of an annual license tax for motor vehicles. The Su-
preme Court held that the decision of the Board was not unreasonable or
0135 N.E.2d 64 (Ohio App. 1956).
"The petition of the plaintiff prayed for a decree vacating and setting aside a de-
linquent tax sale of a portion of the parcel of real estate owned by the plaintiff. The
common pleas court rendered judgment for the defendants, county auditor, county
treasurer and the purchaser at the delinquent tax sale. On appeal on questions of
law and fact, the court of appeals ordered a decree for plaintiff.
F ootnote mention should also be made of the case of Hyland v. Pfalzgraf, 98 Ohio
App. 503, 130 N.E.2d 414 (1953), in which it was held that a plaintiff who owned
two parcels of land by separate deeds, with parcel No. 1 having a specific reservation
of a sewer easement for the benefit of parcel No. 2, having lost parcel No. 1 by
forfeiture followed by a sale as forfeited land, with the auditor's deed specifically
reserving the sewer easement for the benefit of parcel No. 2, was entitled to a judg-
ment quieting tide to a sewer easement over the defendant's parcel purchased at the
forfeited land sale.
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unlawful, in affirming its decision.1 2  The court construed together Ohio
Revised Code sections 4501.01 and 5701.03, and determined that the
trailers were not removed from the definition of personal property by the
latter section because of the exception in the former from the defimtion
of "owner," of a dealer regularly engaged in selling, displaying, offering
for sale or dealing in motor vehicles. Also, the fact that the dealer had
secured licenses and paid the annual license tax prescribed by statute did
not change his status from that of a "dealer" to one of "owner."
Ohio Revised Code section 5711.27 requires a taxpayer to make a
proper return of all personal property. In the event the taxpayer does
not make a return or omits any item of taxable property, the assessor
must add to the assessment of each class or item of taxable property
which the taxpayer has failed to return or list, an additional 50 percent
of its value. Furthermore, Ohio Revised Code section 323.17 imposes a
penalty of ten percent of the amount due and unpaid of any installment
of taxes, other than real estate taxes and assessments, for such failure.
A principal question raised in a recent Supreme Court case' 3 was whether
the ten percent penalty imposed -by the latter statute could be added to
the amount of the personal property tax derived from the 50 percent
additional assessment inposed for nonfiling by the former section. The
court concluded that the 50 percent additional assessment was intended
by the legislature as a penalty, and held that the ten percent penalty on the
additional penalty assessment was illegal, a penalty upon a penalty being
concedely unlawful. 14 Even assuming that the intention of the General
Assembly was not clear, the majority opinion concluded, the general
rule of construction of statutes which levy a tax - that they be strictly
construed against the taxing authority and in favor of the taxpayer
would require the holding that the 50 percent assessment is a penalty.
3. Muncipal Income Taxation
A question of the validity of a classification between persons receiv-
ing income primarily from wages, salaries and other compensation of em-
ployees, and persons deriving income from net profits, with a different
method of assessment as to each, arose under the Cincinnati "Earned
Income Tax Ordinance" of 1954. The classification issue had been be-
fore the Supreme Court of Ohio in 1955, and the ordinance was sus-
'Trailer Mart v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St. 354, 130 N.E.2d 793 (1955).
"In re Estate of Lang, 164 Ohio St. 500, 132 N.E.2d 96 (1956)
", While the Board of Tax Appeals incorrectly denied the remission of the penalty
requested, the court held that it properly affirmed the decision of the Tax Commis-
sioner in his dismissal of an application for the remission of the penalty because the
OHIO REvIsED CODE § 5715.39 had transferred his authority to remit taxes and
penalties thereon to the Board of Tax Appeals.
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tamed.' 5 The more elaborate opinion of the court of appeals in support
of its 1954 decision, was released during 1956.16
The ordinance divided earned income into two general classes: (1)
wages, salaries and other compensation of employees and (2) net profits
of businesses, corporations and self-employed persons. The tax was n-
posed on both classes from April 1 to October 31, but different methods
of calculation were employed. The tax as to the first group was calcu-
lated on the gross earnings for the period; the tax on the second group
was computed on the basis of 7/12 of the annual net profits. The Su-
preme Court had held that the basis of classification was unobjectionable
as long as the impact was substantially uniform as to each class.17 Two
additional interesting points are made in the court of appeals opinion:
(1) a tax law is per se due process since it is designed to raise revenue
and within the competency of the city council; (2) where the law is con-
fined to the raising of revenue, the power to classify is broader than it is
in relation to other legislation. On the latter point the opinion points out
that in choosing the objects and persons to be taxed, there is a certain
discrimination between the class which is taxed and that which is not.
This type of discrimination does not affect validity. It is only when those
similarly situated are unequally burdened that the constitutional require-
ments of equal protection are violated.
4. Corporate Franchise Tax
In a Supreme Court decision' 8 upon an appeal from the Board of Tax
Appeals, the franchise-fee certifications of the Tax Commissioner under
Ohio Revised Code section 5733.05, were questioned. The foreign
corporation contended that it was not doing business in Ohio and further
that it was erroneous to include general Ohio bank deposits in the tax
base. The Supreme Court agreed with the Board's determination that
appellant was doing business in Ohio; except for patents and an experi-
mental account, all of its assets and property were in Ohio, practically
all of its corporate activity was in Ohio, no business was done elsewhere,
all earnings and money were deposited in Ohio banks and all accounts
were paid within Ohio, and, in addition, all officers were residents of
Ohio. The court also affirmed the determination to include the Ohio
'SClark v. Cincinnati, 163 Ohio St. 532, 137 N.E.2d 363 (1955), affirming thejudgment in the principal case.
"°Clark v. Cincinnati, 99 Ohio App. 152, 131 N.E.2d 599 (1954)
17 Chief Justice Weygandt dissented on the ground that the ordinance was inconsis-
tent with OHIo CONST. art. XII, § 8, providing that income taxes may be either
uniform or graduated. In his view this ordinance imposed neither. Judge Hart's
dissent was based on the discriminatory nature of the tax, in his opimon.
'Comer Co. v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St. 429, 131 N.E.2d 581 (1956)
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bank deposits in the tax -base. Appellant, a Delaware corporation, con-
tended that these deposits had a situs elsewhere, but the court agreed with
the Board that the deposits should be included where the company's real
estate is in Ohio and its bank deposits are received and disbursed in Ohio
alone.19
Another decision involved a construction of the statute imposing an
annual franchise tax on the privilege of being an insurance company20
The plaintiff sued to recover a franchise tax paid for the year 1951 on
the basis that it had already paid that tax once, having already paid a tax
in 1951 based on its annual statement for 1950. Plaintiff had obtained
permission to dissolve, but this was granted only on the condition imposed
by the Superintendent of Insurance that it pay a franchise tax for 1951
based on its 1951 business prior to its dissolution. The tax was then
paid under protest.
The governing statute referred to the business of the corporation dur-
ing the preceding year under each of the alternative methods of assess-
ment, and the court concluded plaintiff had a cause of action because the
tax levied and paid in 1951, based on the plaintiff's statement for the
year 1950, was a franchise tax for the year 1951 and not for the year
1950.21
5. Sales Taxation
Ohio Revised Code section 5739.01 (E) (2), excepts from "sale at
retail" certain sales of property which are used or consumed directly in
the production of tangible personal property. In applying this exemption
to a manufacturer's purchases of electrical equipment for the transporta-
non of electrical energy from the factory service inlet to the points in
the building where the energy was used, the Supreme Court held that
equipment used to channel high voltage current to points in the factory
where it had to be transformed into lower voltage current to be utilized
in welding machines was not excepted thereunder.2 2
The sales tax law excepts from its provisions fuel sold for use in ships
'The court distinguished its former opinion and holding in C.P Ketterng, Inc. v.
Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 419, 59 N.E.2d 370 (1945), which on its special facts held
that "general" bank deposits in Ohio banks could not be included in the base for
the computation of the franchise tax to be collected from a foreign corporation.
2OIo REv. CODE § 5725.18.
'
1Columbia Fire Ins. Co. v. Tracy, 133 N.E.2d 661 (Ohio C.P. 1953).
'General Motors Corp. v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St. 574, 132 N.E.2d 213 (1956) The
specific equipment involved was switch gears, used as circuit breakers, and cable-
splicing compartments and interrupter switches. This decision follows the holding in
Powhatan Mining Co. v. Peck, 160 Ohio St. 389, 116 N.E.2d 426 (1953), that
property principally used in transportation to or from a manufacturing process was
not used "directly n" it.
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and vessels used or to be used principally in interstate or foreign com-
merce2 3 The Supreme Court had to consider a decision of the Board of
Tax Appeals which approved a sales tax assessment on fuel sold to a
purchaser to be consumed in Ohio and on Lake Erie in dredging opera-
tions mainly within waters in the State of Ohio. The taxpayer's operation
could be characterized as facilitating interstate commerce rather than
transportation in interstate commerce. In applying the pmrinciple of strict
construction of exemptions or exceptions from sales taxation, the court
concluded that taxpayer's activity did not come within the statutory ex-
emption and affirmed the deasion of the Board. 24
While the Ohio sales tax is levied on retail sales of tangible personal
property, the statute also sets out a presumption that all sales made in
Ohio are subject to the -tax, unless the contrary is shown.25 The statute
also set forth a method of establishing non-taxability by a certificate sup-
plied by the purchaser to the vendor, and a failure to supply the certifi-
cate within the appropriate time renders the sale subject to the tax.26
The Supreme Court has given literal effect to these provisions,27 holding
that there is an absolute obligation upon the vendor to obtain the certifi-
care within 'the specified tune. The court declared that the General
Assembly possesses the power to levy a tax on every sale of tangible
personal property made in the state and that it has so provided for its
collection on other than retail sales when the certificate is not obtained
as required by the statute and the regulation.
Ohio Revised Code section 5739.14 imposes a duty upon the pur-
chaser of a business to determine from the Department of Taxation
whether the seller has any accrued but unpaid sales taxes due, and to
deduct the amount of such taxes from the purchase price. It also pro-
vides that the purchaser who fails to withhold the amount from the pur-
chase money shall be personally liable. In a suit brought by the state
against the seller and purchaser, an important issue was the affect of the
introduction in evidence of the official certificate of assessment. The
trial court had dismissed the state's action for insufficient evidence
where the only evidence of the amount due was a certified copy of the
assessment. The court of appeals reversed the trial court and rendered
judgment against the purchaser. The Supreme Court affirmed this judg-
ment,"2 holding that a sales tax assessment certificate for taxes due from
Omrro 1Ev. CoD § 5739.02 (B) (18).
"IL.A. Wells Constr. Co. v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St. 357, 130 N.E.2d 803 (1955).
"1 OHio REv. CODE § 5739.02 (B), first unnumbered paragraph.
2Oino REv. CODE § 5739.03 (B), second unnumbered paragraph.
nBellows Co. v. Bowers, 165 Ohio St. 9, 133 N.E.2d 131 (1956)
" State v. Sloan, 164 Ohio St. 579, 132 N.E.2d 460 (1956).
19571
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW[
the seller is admissible as evidence and pruma facie establishes the amount
for which the purchaser is liable.29
A private hospital was assessed by the Tax Commissioner for a sales
tax upon the entire amount of the charges made to patients when its bills
to patients did not separate the charges for medicines and supplies from
the charges for other services rendered. The hospital records, however,
disclosed the nature and character of the various charges which entered
into the single bill rendered to the patient. The court of appeals reversed
the Board's assessment based upon the entire hospital charge, but denied
the contention of the hospital that its bills for medicine and supplies
were purely incidental and therefore not taxable. While the tax may be
assessed on the medicines and supplies furnished it could not be assessed
on the entire hospital bill of the patients under the facts of this case,
where there is a clear separation in the making of the composite charge.30
6. Inhertance Taxatton
A probate court decision 3' dealt with the liability of the non-probate
estate for payment of debts against the estate in determining the estate
for inheritance tax purposes. The widow had previously obtained an
order setting aside as her sole property the value of two joint bank ac-
counts which value, however, was properly included in the estate for in-
heritance purposes. The widow made a notation beside these items in
the inventory, that the survivor waives the right to the joint account as it
was property of the decedent. The widow was seeking to have the joint
accounts included in the assets of the estate, so that the exempt property
and the year's support could be deducted therefrom in calculating the
value of the estate to which the inheritance tax would be applied. The
court held that only such amount of the debts may be deducted in calcu-
:'The strong dissent by Judge Bell (concurred in by Stewart and Taft, JJ.) raises
considerable doubt concerning the wisdom of the court's holding. In the first place,
he could find no provision in the statute whatever which would apply the prior
assessment to the purchaser of the business. In the second place, he urged that the
giving of prima facie effect to the certificate of amount owed against subsequent
purchasers worked such a hardship on them as not to be within the legislative com-
petence or intent. The following paragraph from the dissenting opinion effectively
states the position against the majority s holding:
"The duy imposed by statute on the subsequent purchasers is to pay the 'taxes,
interest and penalties accrued and unpaid on account of the operation of the business
by the former owner. It does not impose a duty upon them to defend against an
assessment which was not made against them, of which they had no notice and against
which they had no opportunity to protest. If pay they must, let it be after the state
has adduced in evidence the basic facts from which it can be determined whether
there are taxes due and unpaid, and if so how much."
'St. Francis Hospital Ass n v. Bowers, 99 Ohio App. 133, 131 N.E.2d 624 (1954)
"In re Williams Estate, 138 N.E.2d 189 (Ohio Prob. 1956)
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lating the inheritance tax as does not exceed the assets (probate) in the
estate on the date of death.
Another case32 required the court to define the phraseology "any per-
son dissatisfied" as used in Ohio Revised Code section 5731.38 and to
determine whether a village could appeal from the probate court's decision
on origin of the inheritance tax. The court held that this section made
no provision for the filing of exceptions by a municipality to a deter-
mination by the probate court of the place of origin of the inheritance
tax and, therefore, an appeal could not be maintained by the village.
Remedies
1. Admnistratsve Appeals
The Supreme Court3 3 continues to hold that the provisions of Ohio
Revised Code section 5717.02, regulating the procedure of appeals from
the Tax Commissioner to the Board of Tax Appeals, are iarsdiatzral,
and a failure to give the notice of appeal to the Tax Commissioner is a
proper basis for the Board's dismissing the appeal. The reasoning in
support of this position is more elaborately set forth in a 1946 decision of
the Supreme Court.3 4
2. Sutas to Recover Taxes
A taxpayer's action was brought to enjoin the levy and collection of
a tax by a conservancy district. This action resulted in a temporary in-
junction against the collection of the tax. In the meantime, however,
the plaintiff and about 70,000 other taxpayers proceeded to pay the levy.
No action was brought by any of these taxpayers within one year of the
payment to recover the taxes so paid under the provisions of Ohio Re-
vised Code sections 2723.01 and 2723.03. 5 The trial court gave judg-
ment for a refund. The court of appeals held that a taxpayer could not
'In re Estate of Hutson v. Village of Bethel, 100 Ohio App. 473, 137 N.E.2d 407
(1953).
'Zephyr Room v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St. 287, 130 N.E.2d 362 (1955).
"American Restaurant & Lunch Co. v. Glander, 147 Ohio St. 147, 70 N.E.2d 93
(1946). See also Kent Provision Co. v. Peck, 159 Ohio St. 84, 110 N.E.2d 776
(1953), wherein the appellant apparently attempted in good faith to comply with
the mandatory provisions of the statute. See 1953 Survey, 5 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 227
(1954).
= -OHIo REv. CODE § 2723.01 authorizes both injunction suits against levy or col-
lection of taxes and assessments and actions to recover them when collected within
one year after they are collected.
OHIo REV. CODE § 2723.03, indicates that the filing of a written protest strictly
in accordance with its provisions at the time of payment of a tax or assessment will
prevent a dismissal of an action to recover on the ground that it was voluntarily paid.
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